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Abstract
Background: Virus Resistant Cassava for Africa (VIRCA) is an agricultural biotechnology public-private partnership
(PPP) comprising the Donald Danforth Plant Sciences Center (DDPSC), National Agricultural Research Organization
(NARO) of Uganda and Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI). The project seeks to develop virus-resistant
cassava for farmers in Kenya and Uganda. Yet, there is much public skepticism about the use of genetically
modified (GM) crops and private sector involvement in Africa. This case study sought to understand the role of
trust in the VIRCA partnership.
Methods: We conducted semi-structured, face-to-face interviews to obtain stakeholders’ views on the challenges
to, and practices for, building trust in the VIRCA partnership. Interviewee responses, together with relevant
documents and articles, were analyzed to generate descriptions of how trust is operationalized in this evolving
agbiotech PPP. Data were analyzed based on recurring and emergent themes from the interviewee responses.
Results: Various factors undermine and build trust in agbiotech PPPs. Individual and institutional enthusiasm and
detailed collaborative agreements stipulating partner roles and responsibilities are likely to enhance trust among
partners. On the other hand, negative perceptions propagated by international partners about the capacities of
African institutions and scientists, coupled with slow regulatory processes in Africa, are likely to be impediments to
trust building.
Conclusions: Based on the findings of this study, we have derived four key lessons. First, differences in the
capacity of the partner institutions and individuals should be respected. Second, technical and infrastructural
capacity support for regulatory processes in Africa must be built. Third, detailed agreements and open and
transparent partner practices during project implementation are necessary to dispel perceptions of inequality
among partners. Fourth, institutional and individual commitment to succeed is important in initiation of the
project. These lessons can be used by other agbiotech PPPs as a guide for building trust among partners and with
the community.
Background
The importance of cassava in sub-Saharan Africa
Agbeli, the name for cassava in one of the indigenous lan-
guages spoken in Ghana, Togo and Benin, translates to
“there is life”; this translation reflects the importance
many Africans attribute to the crop [1]. Cassava is to
Africa what rice is to Asia and potatoes to Ireland. A
third of Africa’s population, estimated at over 250 million
people, depend directly on cassava as their primary
source of calories, with their per capita consumption in
the range of 200 to 400 kilograms [2].
Uganda and Kenya are two of the five East African Com-
munity (EAC) countries. Uganda leads the other four —
Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi— in cassava pro-
duction. Cassava is a food securitya crop and the second
most important source of carbohydrate in Uganda after
plantains [3]. For Ugandans, cassava is important for the
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) on food security [4]. Its tuberous root is a source
of food and can be used industrially as a source of starch.
Its leaves are used as a vegetable and the stem as firewood.
Ugandans have therefore coined the expression ‘wamalako
nga Muwogo’ in one of their ethnic languages, which can
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be translated to “you are as complete as cassava” because
of its usefulness.
Current barriers to the potential role of cassava in
African agriculture
Despite the obvious significance of cassava in sub-Saharan
Africa, and specifically in East Africa, cassava is described
as an ‘orphan crop’ [5]. An orphan crop is defined as “that
crop species which has been under-exploited for its contri-
bution towards food security, health (nutritional/medic-
inal), income generation and environmental effects” [6].
Unlike major commercial crops like maize and soybean,
there has been little effort to improve orphan crops via
genetic engineering because they are rarely traded in inter-
national markets. Paradoxically, studies indicate that
investment in genetically modified (GM) orphan crops like
cassava will immensely benefit its producers [5] and there-
fore contribute significantly to the economic wellbeing of
millions of people in sub-Saharan Africa.
Cassava is also tolerant to the adverse climatic condi-
tions and poor soils prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa [2].
This attribute, combined with its high carbohydrate con-
tent, makes it a popular crop for families in sub-Saharan
Africa. Unfortunately, cassava is threatened by two dis-
eases: cassava mosaic disease (CMD) and cassava brown
streak disease (CBSD) [2]. CMD is caused by cassava
mosaic viruses (CMV) [7]. In the early 1990s, CMD
became a significant burden to the agriculture sector in
Uganda and western Kenya. The spread of the disease in
Uganda led to a 64% reduction in the yield of cassava—
from a high of 3.6 million tonnes in 1989 to 2.08 million
tonnes in 1994—threatening food security in the country
[3]. The disease spreads between Uganda and western
Kenya, where cassava is a staple food crop [8], through the
sharing of planting materials by farmers across the Kenya-
Uganda border [9].
By the year 2000, the use of cassava varieties with CMD
resistance had led to a recovery in the production of cas-
sava, which surpassed the pre-1990 levels [3]. However,
CBSD began to re-emerge in 2004 in high altitude areas,
therefore rendering the aforementioned varieties vulner-
able [10]. CBSD is caused by two different species of cas-
sava brown streak virus (CBSV) [11] and its means of
transmission and distribution resembles that of CMD.
With CBSD, even the most CMD-tolerant cassava varieties
such as “2961” cannot avoid getting infected. The impact
of CBSD is much more severe than that of CMD. On
Tuesday 25th May 2010, “Deadly cassava disease hits
Uganda” [12] was the headline of an article in Uganda’s
leading national daily, the New Vision. The news flash
about CBSD appearing six years after its re-emergence in
2004 [10] emphasized the magnitude of the threat posed
by the virus disease on cassava yield.
In addition to an overall reduction in yield caused by
CBSD, the edible tuberous roots of cassava show severe
necrosis and are unfit for human consumption. On the
31st of May 2010, the New York Times published a story
about a Ugandan farmer who displayed cassava roots
affected by CBSD and stated that even “pigs refuse it”
[13]. This means that the crop, once infected by CBSD, is
greatly abhorred by its consumers. The re-emergence of
CBSD in eastern Africa also posed a double threat to
CMD-sensitive crops, since the two pathogens can simul-
taneously infect the same cassava plant [10]. Both dis-
eases can leave complete crops devoid of edible
vegetation, adversely affecting household food security.
The Virus Resistant Cassava for Africa (VIRCA) project,
an agricultural biotechnology public-private partnership
(PPP), was formed to develop virus-resistant varieties of
cassava to deliver to farmers in the region for manage-
ment of CMD and CBSD.
The history and partnership of VIRCA
The expression “opportunities multiply as they are
seized” best depicts the initial stages of implementing
the VIRCA project. The project began in 2006 when the
then Director of International Programs at the Donald
Danforth Plant Sciences Centre (DDPSC) toured Kenya,
Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa and Malawi in order to
find partners to conduct field trials for virus-resistant
cassava, a transgenic technology that had been devel-
oped by DDPSC. At this early stage, DDPSC chose to
partner with the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute
(KARI) in Kenya and the National Agricultural Research
Organization (NARO) in Uganda because of the for-
mer’s experience in conducting trials on transgenic
sweet potato and the latter’s enthusiasm and experience
in cassava research. In 2006, at a meeting in Uganda
between the DDPSC and NARO, the Director of Inter-
national Programs at DDPSC observed enthusiasm and
willingness from the executives of NARO’s cassava pro-
gramme to partake in the project. As a result, the
VIRCA project was organized by three core partners—
DDPSC, NARO and KARI—in addition to other colla-
borators, including: the Monsanto Company, Monsanto
Fund, United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID), and BioCassava Plus (see Additional file
1 for short profiles of the partners and collaborators).
The primary goal of the project is to develop farmer-
preferred cassava varieties resistant to CMD and CBSD,
the two viral diseases responsible for the greatest yield
loss of cassava. The secondary goal of the project is to
increase research ownership and capacity in the target
countries: Uganda and Kenya [14]. The project is orga-
nized into phase I (2006-2010) and phase II (2011-
2015). The project aims to provide virus-resistant
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cassava varieties to farmers by 2015 for improved pro-
duction and food security [15].
The roles of the VIRCA partners and collaborators
DDPSC took the lead in research and capacity building
while NARO and KARI led in the identification of farmer-
preferred varieties and technology testing in the field.
During phase I, funding was provided by the Monsanto
Fund and USAID. [16], while the Monsanto Company
provided their proprietary enabling technologies royalty-
free and DDPSC developed some of the technologies
which confer cassava with disease resistance [5]. USAID
awarded the DDPSC a US $2.5 million grant for phase I.
Further funding to support phase II of the project has
been provided by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
and the Monsanto Fund (the primary responsibilities of
the partners and collaborators are outlined in Additional
file 2).
During phase I, the project focused on research along
four steps: the identification of the target cassava varieties,
the generation of transgenic events, confined field trials
(CFTs) to test efficacy and biosafety, and regulatory
approval for commercialization [17]. During this phase,
the activities of VIRCA were harmonized with those of
BioCassava Plusb, which is also managed by the DDPSC
[18]. The aim of the BioCassava Plus project is to develop
improved cassava varieties with enhanced bio-available
levels of zinc, iron, protein, vitamin A, and vitamin E, as
well as reduced quantities of toxic cyanogenic glycosides
and improved post-harvest durability (see Additional file 3
for an outline of the project phases and activities). With
regards to capacity building, Uganda has developed
advanced biosafety facilities and several CFTs for a num-
ber of crops in addition to cassava as a result of this pro-
ject [14].
The importance of trust in agbiotech PPPs
Trust among the partners and with the community has
been identified as an important element of effective PPPs
[19]. Factors affecting the establishment, development, and
maintenance of inter-personal and inter-organizational
trust can either ensure or compromise the success of
agbiotech projects. Agbiotech PPPs often face skepticism
and resistance due to the public’s lack of trust in geneti-
cally engineered crops and the involvement of the private
sector. While the public sector views the intentions of the
private sector with suspicion [20,21] due to fear that mul-
tinational biotech companies seek to take advantage of
poor nations [22], the private sector views the public
sector as slow and inefficient and resistant to change [21].
In this study we therefore focused on understanding
the role of trust in the VIRCA partnership—specifically,
trust among the partners on the one hand and with the
community on the other. The objectives of the study
were to: 1) describe trust-building practices in the devel-
opment of the VIRCA project; 2) describe the challenges
associated with trust-building in the partnership and; 3)
determine what makes these practices effective or inef-
fective. The findings of this study provide lessons on the
role of trust in agbiotech PPPs and can be applied to
similar projects in Africa to mitigate the consequences of
mistrust commonly associated with agbiotech PPPs.
Methods
Data were collected by conducting interviews with key
informants who are knowledgeable about the project;
reviewing publicly available project documents and
research articles; and through direct observations.
We received Research Ethics Board (REB) approval from
the University Health Network, University of Toronto for
conducting the case study. Interviewees were identified
first by making a list of key individuals associated with the
project based on the stakeholders groups as identified in
the research protocol. This list was then populated further
through snowball sampling through the Sandra Rotman
Centre’s Social Audit Project [23] using stakeholder infor-
mants who were familiar with the VIRCA Project. A total
of 22 interviewees were identified through this process, 12
of whom were invited for interview (those who were clo-
sely linked to activities of phase I of the project) and eight
interviewed. The other four were unavailable for various
reasons. Potential interviewees were sent an invitation,
which included an explanation of the case study series, to
participate in the interview. Those who consented to parti-
cipate were informed that the interview would be
recorded, transcribed verbatim and then analyzed. Those
interviewed were drawn from each of the three partner
institutions: NARO, DDPSC and KARI. The interviewees
included executives from the Cassava Programme in
Uganda, the National Crop Resources Research Institute
(NACRRI), the KARI Biotechnology Centre, the Interna-
tional Programs at the DDPSC, and the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, as well as the project officers from
Kenya and Uganda.
The interviews took place in Uganda, Kenya, Zanzibar
and the United States – at the convenience of the intervie-
wees. The interviews were face-to-face and each lasted
approximately one and a half hours. A semi-structured
interview guide was used and included questions on the
interviewees’ background, their understanding of the pro-
ject, and their interpretation of the word trust. The inter-
views further explored the interviewees’ perception of
trust among the partners and with the public, apparent
challenges to trust building and observed trust-building
practices. Finally, interviewees were asked for advice on
how to improve trust in agbiotech PPPs (see Additional
file 4 for sample questions from the interview guide). Data
was analyzed based on recurring and emergent themes to
Ezezika et al. Agriculture & Food Security 2012, 1(Suppl 1):S7
http://www.agricultureandfoodsecurity.com/content/1/S1/S7
Page 3 of 8
create a comprehensive narrative on how trust is under-
stood and built among the partners and with the
community.
Results and discussion
We found that the stakeholders’ understanding of trust
and its elements informs the perspective with which they
identify the challenges and practices of trust building and
the expected outcomes. According to our interviewees,
factors that contribute to the success of PPPs include cap-
ability (technical competence and ability to follow the
law); enthusiasm to succeed; access to finances; strong lea-
dership; qualified personnel; and appropriate agreements
with other partners. The interviewees further pointed out
that, aside from these factors, there were no special prac-
tices intended to build trust.
VIRCA partners’ understanding of trust
The interviewees understood trust to be an important
aspect of a relationship [between parties] that allows them
to develop confidence in each other. For example, an
interviewee from NARO explained that trust is what binds
partners together. Further, interviewees said building trust
requires time, in order for partners to understand each
other’s roles and expectations. One interviewee described
a form of ‘competence trust’: trust is based on the kind of
outcomes of the activities in which the partners are
engaged. According to an interviewee from NARO, com-
petence was evident during initial efforts in organizing the
project when NARO’s historical successes (outcomes) in
breeding cassava for virus resistance were recognized by
DDPSC. Other elements of trust identified by the intervie-
wees include mutual respect for partner roles, sincerity
and transparency.
Trust-building challenges
Negative perceptions about African scientists and
institutions
NARO expressed concerns about attitudes at DDPSC
regarding the integrity and capacity of African scientists
and institutions to undertake the VIRCA project. Accord-
ing to NARO, the perceptions pertained to the corruption
that bedevils many African governments. According to an
interviewee from NARO, DDPSC scientists believed that
they had “not seen Africa using facilities given to them;
they [the facilities] bec[a]me white elephants.” From the
perspective of the scientists at NARO, these perceptions
elicited monitoring by DDPSC scientists, which conveyed
a sense of paternalism and inequality against NARO and
KARI, thereby threatening trust building among the
partners.
However, some documented facts give DDPSC’s per-
ception some credence. A feature appearing in The
New African in 2009c quoted a Swedish International
Development Agency (SIDA) official in Uganda saying,
“a government in power will always use the money
[development aid] as they wish. There is nothing stop-
ping them to use it as they wish.” This statement was
made in reference to the Ugandan government ’s
diverting of SIDA aid to the war against the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda instead of
supporting the running of rural medical clinics, which
later had to be closed.
DDPSC argued that their perception stemmed from
underlying cultural differences between the partners,
which made them cautious and curious about partners’
actions. Unlike the DDPSC, however, the public in Kenya
and Uganda have expressed their trust in the stewardship
of KARI and NARO respectively, as was claimed by an
interviewee from KARI. Over time, DDPSC became con-
vinced by the work ethics of the African team members
and was able to have more confidence in them.
Low emphasis on communication and community
engagement
Interviewees reported a skewed emphasis in favor of the
product development component at the expense of other
components (such as regulatory, communication and out-
reach) and said the teams are not moving in tandem. This
unequal emphasis on the project component was likely to
introduce discontent among team members. They listed
the positive results that would ensue if all the teams were
brought on board together at the same time and moved
consistently together in terms of information sharing and
capacity building. This would contribute to enhanced
team spirit, trust (between the teams), and productivity in
the next phase of the project.
An interviewee from KARI stated that trust between the
project and the community is “poor” and that farmers do
not know much about the VIRCA project. According to
Hawkins [24], there is a lack of accurate information
among farmers in Africa due to the traditional research
model, in which research works for, rather than with,
farmers; this implies a situation in which farmers are not
partners in the process of identifying problems and their
solutions, which may, as a result, render such solutions
innapropriate. An interviewee from DDPSC linked farm-
ers’ apparent lack of trust in the performance of biotech-
nology to their lack of background knowledge that would
enable them to form their own opinions. There is there-
fore a need for creating awareness on the nature and per-
formance of GM crops.
Slow regulatory processes in the implementing countries
Although Kenya’s legal framework and experience in
genetic modification work allowed it to engage with
DDPSC before Uganda, Uganda gradually overtook
Kenya in terms of implementing the project. The slow
pace of the implementation of the project in Kenya was
due to delayed regulatory processes, which contributed
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to deteriorating trust between KARI and DDPSC, as the
latter interpreted the slowness as reluctance on the for-
mer’s side. On the other hand, KARI stated that DDPSC
did not readily provide the information necessary for reg-
ulatory approvals and therefore argued that DDPSC was
to blame for the delay. According to one interviewee, this
led DDPSC to threaten withdrawing their support for
KARI, who, as a result, felt that DDPSC had less trust in
them than they had in NARO.
NARO also underwent instances of delayed regulatory
processes, as observed by DDPSC. NARO, however,
argued that the delays were due to biological challenges
and reorganization within the regulatory institutions.
Midway through the first phase of the project, the Insti-
tutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) and National Biosaf-
ety Committee (NBC) in Uganda, the key regulatory
institutions on biosafety, underwent changes in manage-
ment. This meant that the new team needed to learn
how the committees operate, which therefore led to the
delays. At the same time, the VIRCA project initially
solely targeted CMD. It was later on that CBSD, to which
varieties already resistant to CMD were highly suscepti-
ble, re-emerged. This necessitated the project to adopt a
new objective focusing on the development of CBSD-
resistant varieties that was originally not considered.
Investors of agbiotech in Africa consider regulatory
processes to be slow and at costs not commensurate to
the market size [25] because of limited capacity on the
part of government and scientists, which tends to paral-
yze decision making. Though the speed of regulatory
approvals in both Uganda and Kenya improved as the
regulators became more confident in the applicants, the
delays demanded the deadline for product delivery to be
extended – from 2013 to 2015.
Perceptions of differential funding for Uganda and Kenya
Because of the different paces in project implementation
in Kenya and Uganda, DDPSC stated that its relationship
with KARI had not matured, as it did with NARO, and
that the former was not delivering the same kinds of
results as the latter had been. One interviewee explained
that the progress of the projects is influenced by the way
in which funding is channeled to the African partners:
while the activities in Uganda [NARO] are funded by the
Monsanto Fund and the Danforth Centre, all the activities
in Kenya [KARI] are funded by USAID. There were per-
ceptions that, whereas Kenya received piecemeal funding
for no more than one year at a time, Uganda received cash
for a whole five-year phase. This means that the activities
in Uganda ran uninterrupted, while those in Kenya experi-
enced frequent and long intervals in which there was no
work. The interviewee interpreted such differential fund-
ing as preferential treatment in favor of NARO and felt
that KARI received less financial support and training
opportunities than their Ugandan counterparts.
Trust-building practices
Interviewees identified several practices that contributed
to enhancing trust among the partners in the project and
with the community. Open and regular communication
among the partners was the most talked about practice.
One interviewee pointed out that there were no special
exercises put in place specifically to foster trust; rather,
trust was a result of the established management practices.
Regular exchange visits by the partners
An interviewee from NARO said that regular exchange
visits among partners boosted trust in the partnership.
The visiting partners were exposed to the ongoing project
activities at laboratory and field levels and had the oppor-
tunity to present seminars about the project to the wider
community in partner institutions, thus creating awareness
of the project. Exchange visits between KARI and NARO
were also opportunities for sharing germplasm and facil-
ities such as greenhouses for experiments.
One interviewee from KARI recognized a direct con-
nection among the visits, technical competence, and
trust. He said the visits improved mutual understanding
and trust between KARI and DDPSC, while making them
more competent to talk about VIRCA. This in turn led to
the achievement of project milestones and enhanced
trust among partners. Another interviewee from KARI
underscored the need to include the members in top
management of the partner institutions and regulatory
organizations in the exchange visits. He observed that
this will give them an opportunity to appreciate the bene-
fits of the project, therefore leading to enhanced trust
institution-wide. Spielman, Hartwich and Grebmer [20]
observed that PPPs could achieve greater success with
face-to-face interaction, hands-on collaboration and
scientific exchange programmes. The visits contributed
to trust building as they provided the partners a forum in
which to mingle with stakeholders and get their feel of
the project.
Training of scientists and other technical staff
Before returning home as highly skilled people, the scien-
tists being trained at DDPSC received exposure to
extended periods of interaction with DDPSC staff during
which they built trust with one another. This training was
well received at home and was, according to an intervie-
wee from NARO, one of the “key things that happened ...
without [the need for] paying fees.” We observe that the
technical competence acquired was an important ingredi-
ent for trust building amid myths about biotechnology
and its efficacy.
In addition, an interviewee from DDPSC recom-
mended closer private sector involvement to comple-
ment public sector competence, especially on regulatory
matters. He noted that successful commercialization of
technologies from research all over the world has been
associated with active involvement of the private sector
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in the implementation of projects. With this kind of
involvement, the trained scientists are likely to benefit
from unique private sector expertise and experience
with the regulatory aspects, which will enhance the for-
mer’s ability to comply with the law. Ultimately, this will
improve trust between the partners and regulators.
Open and regular communication between the partners
Open communication was achieved by involving the part-
ners in the initial setting of project goals; holding bi-
weekly teleconferences; having face-to-face interactions;
and regularly reporting on project activities. These proce-
dures provided an opportunity for sharing information
and having open discussions in which partners could pro-
vide feedback to one another – all of which helped resolve
any issues that could potentially arise, thus creating posi-
tive group dynamics conducive to building trust. At the
same time, bi-annual and annual financial and technical
reports were regularly shared among the stakeholders,
which helped enhance trust among the partners.
One interviewee, however, pointed out that trust among
the VIRCA partners was not very high, due to some short-
comings – notably, the lack of knowledge of the kind of
agreement DDPSC had with NARO and lack of an agree-
ment between NARO and KARI. This suggests that the
flow of information may not have been all-round, which,
as observed by one interviewee, may be counterproductive
to trust building particularly with regards to product shar-
ing between the two African countries. Hall [26] recom-
mends that in order for PPPs in agricultural systems to
realize full potential, new ways are needed to break down
barriers and increase communication and trust between
the public and the private sector partners.
Clear definition of roles and responsibilities
VIRCA partners had well-defined roles so each partner
was held accountable for the outcomes. Appropriate
assignment of roles and responsibilities is helpful in deal-
ing with cases of internal conflict among partners [20].
VIRCA partners recognized this early and therefore
entered into a memorandum of understanding before the
project started, according to an interviewee from NARO.
One interviewee partly attributed the high level of trust
and accountability among the partners to documents,
reports, and agreed upon responsibilities and expectations.
The clear definition of roles and expectations served as a
foundation for building trust.
Interviewees emphasized the need for, and importance
of, drafting a detailed agreement immediately upon com-
mencement of the project that stipulates the individual
partners’ contributions; roles; ownership; and use of intel-
lectual property rights (IPRs). The agreement should
clearly convey if a company’s IPRs are being licensed roy-
alty-free, for example. Such an agreement is necessary in
order to prevent challenges midway through the project,
as witnessed in the Insect Resistant Maize for Africa
(IRMA) project in Kenya, which was a research-only
license [27].
Institutional and individual commitment to succeed
One interviewee from DDPSC said: All the people work-
ing on the project really need to put intensive effort into
making sure that it is going correctly. Choosing staff with
excellent academic and scientific credentials and personal
interest in the success of the project was recognized as a
great asset to the VIRCA project. These are people who,
even when other attractive opportunities arise, would
give VIRCA priority, while recognizing that transitions
would likely slow the project’s progress.
The partner organizations comprising the VIRCA pro-
ject were recognized as committed to the project and
did not treat it as a peripheral activity. Such institutional
support helped spur individual scientists to commit to
achieving sustainability and positive outcomes. The
enthusiasm of scientists from NARO to the highest level
of management endeared them to DDPSC. On the other
hand, Kenya’s [KARI’s] apparent reluctance to engage
with DDPSC may have led to a “bumpy” relationship,
particularly in the early stages of the partnership,
according to an interviewee from DDPSC.
Conclusions
Based on the findings of the study, we have derived four
key lessons that other agbiotech PPPs may apply in build-
ing trust among partners and with the community. First,
trust between partners may be adversely impacted by
negative perceptions propagated about the capacity of
partner institutions and individuals. Misperceptions may
misrepresent character and thereby overlook the actual
strengths and weaknesses of the individual or institution.
Unless such perceptions are handled tactfully, the absence
of reciprocated trust cannot produce an environment con-
ducive to an effective partnership. Entering into a partner-
ship should happen on a clean slate, devoid of negative
perceptions pertaining to the capacity of the partners. This
will provide a good foundation for trust building.
Second, the success of agbiotech projects in Africa is
anchored on the delivery of milestones, which is also
dependent on the competence of the institutions and
individuals engaged in the projects. This study shows
that technical and infrastructural capacity support for
regulatory processes is necessary for the success of
agbiotech PPPs. As regulatory arrangements in sub-
Saharan African countries are slowly evolving, there will
be a need for technical, financial and infrastructural sup-
port from partners from more developed countries, both
at the national and institutional level. Private sector
technical capacity and experience is therefore necessary
to enable fast tracking of regulatory approvals, which
would contribute to the enhancement of trust among
partners.
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Third, detailed agreements and open and transparent
practices during project implementation are necessary to
dispel perceptions of partner inequality. We observe that
regular exchange visits and open and regular communi-
cation will prevent the development of such perceptions
about other partners and allow the partners to have an
understanding of each other’s circumstances. Detailed
collaborative agreements stipulating partner roles and
responsibilities would also contribute to easing any ten-
sions that may arise from feelings of inequality. Such
agreements offer a sense of security to the partners and
make partners accountable to one another, leading to a
sense of enhanced trust among the partners.
Lastly, institutional and individual commitment to suc-
ceed is necessary for agbiotech PPPs to be successful. In
the absence of adequate and sufficient experiential back-
ground information on the individual partners, the
VIRCA partnership depended on the commitment and
enthusiasm of the organizations and individuals for the
initiation and initial progress of the project. This pro-
vided a foundation for partners to build trust with one
another, as evidenced by consistent provision of funding
for the project, identification of committed and qualified
persons, and the partner institutions’ ownership of the
project. Institutional commitment provides an opportu-
nity for partner interaction and spurs individual scientists
to be more committed in the project. This commitment,
and the trust that ensues, are likely to contribute to sus-
tained research activities beyond the project life.
Endnotes
aFood security exists when all people, at all times, have
physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe
and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and
food preferences for an active and healthy life. URL:
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4671e/y4671e06.htm
bBioCassava Plus is a project managed by Donald
Danforth Plant Sciences Centre and operating in Africa,
Asia, Europe, Latin America and North America whose
objective is to reduce malnutrition among the 250 mil-
lion people in sub-Saharan Africa who rely on cassava
as their staple food by delivering a more nutritious and
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se/NewAfrican_Nilsson.pdf. Accessed 20th June 2011
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